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NOTE
LEDEZMA-COSINO V. SESSIONS:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT MAINTAINS
ARCHAIC VIEW THAT ALCOHOLISM
IS A MORAL CHARACTER FLAW
COREY TIMPSON*
INTRODUCTION
The United States is a “Nation of Immigrants;”1 after the United
States won independence from Great Britain, more people began immi-
grating to the newly established colonies.2 Since then, the United States
remains a top destination for people looking to start a fresh, new life.3
People choose to come to America for many reasons, including to escape
from past persecution, poverty, or to find better job opportunities.4 Re-
gardless of the reasons, people have immigrated and will continue to
immigrate to the United States from all over the world.
Yet, with high rates of immigration come increased regulations. The
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), a branch
of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), controls citizenship
* Doctor of Jurisprudence Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2019;
B.A. Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, May 2016. Executive Research Editor,
2018-2019, Golden Gate University Law Review. The author would like to thank the entire Golden
Gate University Law Review staff for helping edit this piece and especially Heather Varanini for
going above and beyond to help get this Note ready for publication. Finally, the author would like to
thank her family for always being there and supporting her in everything she does.
1 JOHN F. KENNEDY, A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS (1964) (John F. Kennedy wrote this manu-
script in 1958 and it was published posthumously in 1964).
2 Immigration Timeline, THE STATUTE OF LIBERTY ELLIS ISLAND FOUND., INC., https://www
.libertyellisfoundation.org/immigration-timeline (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
3 Id.
4 Christina Nun˜ez, Jana Sepehr & Erica Sanchez, Why People Migrate: 11 Surprising Rea-
sons, GLOBAL CITIZEN (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/why-people-mi
grate-11-surprising-reasons/.
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and immigration as well as enforces the policies in those areas.5 Another
branch of DHS that enforces immigration policies is the United States
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.6 Along with the Executive Of-
fice for Immigration Review, these agencies enforce and adjudicate
claims by immigrants arising from immigration laws, such as those in-
volving deportation.7 Although there are many reasons undocumented
immigrants or permanent residents are deported, deportation typically
occurs when a person violates one or more immigration laws.8
Immigrants, like American citizens, face similar problems and most
come to the United States seeking a better life.9 One such problem is
alcoholism, which affects the United States population in general10 and
increasingly affects the immigrant population.11 Alcoholism, or Alcohol
Use Disorder, is a brain disease that is “characterized by compulsive al-
cohol use, loss of control over alcohol intake, and a negative emotional
state when not using.”12 One study found evidence of alcohol abuse
among immigrants in the U.S. persists despite the fact that alcoholism is
less prevalent among immigrant populations when compared to U.S.-
born citizens.13
This Note focuses on one historically uncommon way in which
courts decide to deport an undocumented immigrant seeking cancellation
of removal.14 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
(“Ninth Circuit”) in Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions found an undocumented
5 Mission Statement, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/aboutus (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018).
6 What We Do, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/overview (last updated
Jan. 3, 2018).
7 Organization, Mission, & Functions Manual: Executive Office for Immigration Review,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jmd/organization-mission-and-functions-manual-execu
tive-office-immigration-review (last updated Aug. 3, 2018).
8 Deportation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/de
portation (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
9 Nun˜ez et al., supra note 4.
10 Alcoholism: Natural History and Background, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCO-
HOLISM, https://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/healthdisparities/alcoholism1.htm (last visited July
31, 2018).
11 Magdalena Szaflarski et al., Epidemiology of Alcohol Abuse Among US Immigrant Popula-
tions, 13 J. IMMIGR. & MINOR HEALTH 647 (2011), available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3133815/.
12 Alcohol Use Disorder, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, (https://www
.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-consumption/alcohol-use-disorders (last visited July
31, 2018).
13 Szaflarski et al., supra note 11.
14 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1996) (explaining that cancellation of removal allows undocu-
mented immigrants subject to deportation to remain in the United States). See also 8 U.S.C.
§1101(f)(1) (the habitual drunkard provision of the good moral character statute that has only been
used one other time as grounds to deport an undocumented immigrant); In re H., 6 I. & N. Dec. 614
(B.I.A. 1955).
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immigrant15 seeking cancellation of removal16 ineligible because he was
considered a “habitual drunkard.”17As an undocumented immigrant, Sal-
omon Ledezma-Cosino (“Ledezma-Cosino”) was subject to deporta-
tion.18 After conceding his eligibility for removal, Ledezma-Cosino
sought cancellation of removal.19 The Immigration Judge20 and the
Board of Immigration Appeals21 denied his request because he was
found to be a habitual drunkard.22 Upon this finding, Ledezma-Cosino
was unable to satisfy the good moral character requirement for cancella-
tion of removal.23 Ultimately, his case was reheard en banc where the
Ninth Circuit vacated the original three-judge panel opinion and upheld
the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision
finding Ledezma-Cosino ineligible for cancellation of removal because
he was a habitual drunkard.24
The first part of this Note discusses the factual and procedural his-
tory and the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions.
Second, this Note discusses the controlling statutes at issue: cancellation
of removal and good moral character. The third part discusses the back-
ground of the habitual drunkard provision, the tests used to determine a
person’s status as a habitual drunkard, and how the habitual drunkard
provision relates to good moral character. Fourth, it argues that the Ninth
Circuit’s analysis regarding a person’s status as a habitual drunkard or
alcoholic should not automatically determine his or her moral character
and that the court erred by finding that it does. Alcoholism is a growing
15 For the purposes of this Note I will be using the more accurate term “undocumented immi-
grant” rather than the outdated term “alien” which is typically used by immigration statutes. See 8
U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1996); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (1996) (using the term “alien”).
16 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b) (1996) (explaining that cancellation of removal is a form of declar-
atory relief for non-resident immigrants seeking to stop his or her deportation in order to remain in
the United States as a resident).
17 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2017). The author disagrees with the
term “habitual drunkard,” however, for the purpose of this Note, the language codified in the statute
is used for lack of a better alternative. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) (2014).
18 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1045.
19 Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 857 F.3d 1042,
1045 (9th Cir. 2017). The vacated Ninth Circuit opinion will be used for factual information not
found in the en banc panel’s decision.
20 An Immigration Judge is “an attorney whom the Attorney General appoints as an adminis-
trative judge within the Executive Office for Immigration Review, qualified to conduct specified
classes of proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (1996).
21 The Board of Immigration Appeals interprets and applies immigration laws and is the high-
est governing administrative body to do so before the matter is taken to the judicial court system.
Board of Immigration Appeals, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Mar. 15, 2018, 3:54 PM), https://www.justice
.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals.
22 Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 1070, 1072 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 857 F.3d 1042,
1045 (9th Cir. 2017).
23 Id.
24 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 2017).
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problem in American society that tends to arise out of external factors
that result in a loss of one’s ability to voluntarily control their alcohol
consumption.25 Thus, a person’s inability to control his or her alcohol
consumption should not automatically indicate a lack of good moral
character. Finally, this Note provides solutions to the problems arising
from the Ninth Circuit’s analysis. The solutions proposed include: accu-
rately defining and distinguishing between the terms habitual drunkard
and alcoholic; amending the habitual drunkard provision of the good
moral character statute; and creating a new standard to deal with immi-
grants found to be habitual drunkards.
I. BACKGROUND OF LEDEZMA-COSINO V. SESSIONS
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF LEDEZMA-COSINO
V. SESSIONS
In 1987,26 Ledezma-Cosino entered the United States illegally from
Mexico.27 Ledezma-Cosino has five children who were born in the
United States and are American citizens, and he has three additional chil-
dren who are not citizens of the United States.28 While in the United
States, Ledezma-Cosino supported his family by working in construc-
tion.29 His doctors diagnosed him with acute alcoholic hepatitis and other
alcohol-related diseases,30 noting a ten-year history of drinking approxi-
mately one liter of tequila daily.31 Ledezma-Cosino’s daughter also testi-
25 See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., The Neurobi-
ology of Substance Use, Misuse, and Addiction, in FACING ADDICTION IN AMERICA: THE SURGEON
GENERAL’S REPORT ON ALCOHOL, DRUGS, AND HEALTH 2-1 (2016), https://addiction.surgeongeneral
.gov/sites/default/files/chapter-2-neurobiology.pdf.
26 The author attempted via internet searches to determine when the Petitioner came into the
U.S., but there is not enough information to ascertain the true year of Petitioner’s entry. Other related
cases and news stories list 1997 as the year Petitioner entered, and thus it seems like the Ninth
Circuit made a numerical error in listing 1987 as the year Petitioner entered the United States.
27 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1045.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 A “chronic alcoholic” is someone with a “progressive behavioral disorder characterized by
a strong urge to consume ethanol and an inability to limit the amount of drinking despite adverse
consequences. Alcoholism, FREE DICTIONARY, https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
Chronic+alcoholic (last accessed Mar. 7, 2018); see also Alcohol Use Disorder, MAYO CLINIC,
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/alcohol-use-disorder/symptoms-causes/syc-
20369243 (last accessed Nov. 9, 2018) (“Alcohol use disorder . . . is a pattern of alcohol use that
involves problems controlling your drinking . . . .”).
31 Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 819 F.3d at 1073, vacated sub nom. Ledezma-Cosino v. Ses-
sions, 857 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2017).
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fied to her father’s drinking problem, saying that “his liver had failed
because of ‘[t]oo much alcohol,’ [and] ‘[t]oo much drinking.’”32
On May 7, 2008, the police detained Ledezma-Cosino in Carlsbad,
California after they stopped and arrested him for driving under the influ-
ence and driving with a suspended license.33 Ledezma-Cosino was then
charged with removability by the Department of Homeland Security.34
Initially, Ledezma-Cosino conceded removability, but later petitioned for
cancellation of removal.35 The judge denied Ledezma-Cosino’s petition
on multiple grounds.36 The first removal hearing resulted in the Immigra-
tion Judge denying relief because Ledezma-Cosino did not meet the
fourth requirement for cancellation of removal—that leaving the United
States would cause great hardship on a family member.37 The first appeal
to the Board of Immigration Appeals resulted in a remand due to an
incomplete record.38 The Immigration Judge continued the second re-
mand hearing because Ledezma-Cosino was in the hospital for a liver
ailment.39 The Immigration Judge placed Ledezma-Cosino’s new medi-
cal records into the hearing record and then decided that he was ineligi-
ble for cancellation of removal on the basis that he was a habitual
drunkard.40 The Immigration Judge made this determination sua sponte
and did not, on remand, state that he was ineligible for failure to meet the
hardship requirement.41 Ultimately, the Board of Immigration Appeals
affirmed only on the basis of Ledezma-Cosino’s status as a habitual
drunkard, barring a finding of good moral character.42
Ledezma-Cosino timely sought review by the Ninth Circuit after the
Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed his eligibility for removal.43 The
sole means to challenge a removal decision is to seek review by the court
of appeals.44 Thus, he brought suit against Loretta Lynch, the Attorney
General at the time, on the grounds that his classification as a habitual
drunkard was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause and Equal
32 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1047.
33 Id. at 1045.
34 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) 2013); Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1045.
35 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2008); Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1045.
36 Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 819 F.3d at 1074, vacated sub nom. Ledezma-Cosino v. Ses-
sions, 857 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2017).
37 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1059 (9th Cir. 2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated sub nom.
Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2017).
43 Id. at 1072.
44 The REAL ID Act, Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B., 119 Stat. 231 (2005); see also Martinez v.
Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012).
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Protection Clause of the Constitution because it determined a person’s
“moral character on the basis of a medical disability.”45 A three-judge
panel reviewed Ledezma-Cosino’s claims “that the Due Process Clause
and Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution forbid the Government
from making such an irrational classification as to moral character on the
basis of a medical disability.”46 The three-judge panel agreed with
Ledezma-Cosino’s Equal Protection argument and found the habitual
drunkard provision unconstitutional.47 The Board of Immigration Ap-
peals decision was then vacated and the case was remanded.48 The Ninth
Circuit then granted a rehearing en banc pursuant to a majority vote.49
Because the Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc, the three-judge
panel decision was vacated.50
The Ninth Circuit en banc panel reviewed the case on three grounds:
(1) whether there was substantial evidence to support Ledezma-Cosino’s
label as a habitual drunkard; (2) whether the habitual drunkard provision
was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause; and (3)
whether the habitual drunkard provision violates the Equal Protection
Clause.51 The court did not decide these three arguments in Ledezma-
Cosino’s favor and his petition for cancellation of removal was denied.52
On August 25, 2017, Ledezma-Cosino filed a timely Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari and the United States Supreme Court denied Ledezma-
Cosino’s petition on January 8, 2018.53
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECLINED TO REVIEW THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS’ DENIAL OF LEDEZMA-COSINO’S
REQUEST FOR CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL
Ledezma-Cosino sought review by the Ninth Circuit on three differ-
ent bases.54 First, he argued that there was insufficient evidence to sup-
port his classification as a habitual drunkard.55 Next, he believed the
term habitual drunkard in the good moral character statute was unconsti-
45 Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 819 F.3d at 1072, vacated sub nom. 857 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th
Cir. 2017).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1073.
48 Id.
49 FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (2016); Cir. R. 35-3 (2007); Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 805
(9th Cir. 2016).
50 Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 839 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2016).
51 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2017).
52 Id. at 1045.
53 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2017)
(No. 17-313) 2017 WL 3809746; Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 643 (2018).
54 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1046.
55 Id.
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tutionally vague.56 Finally, he argued the habitual drunkard provision vi-
olated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.57 The Ninth Circuit reviewed each argument
separately, decided each argument against Ledezma-Cosino, and denied
his petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeal’s denial of
his request for cancellation of removal.58
1. The Ninth Circuit Found Sufficient Evidence to Classify Ledezma-
Cosino as a Habitual Drunkard
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Immigration Judge and the Board
of Immigration Appeals that Ledezma-Cosino qualified as a habitual
drunkard.59 First, the Ninth Circuit defined habitual drunkard as “a per-
son who regularly drinks alcoholic beverages to excess.”60 The court dis-
tinguished between an “alcoholic” and a “habitual drunkard” for its
analysis because Congress’s use of these two terms in different parts of
the statute indicated its intent to distinguish between the two.61 The court
did not define a standard for determining one’s habitual drunkard classi-
fication.62 Rather, the en banc panel reasoned that “the [good moral char-
acter] statute asks whether a person’s conduct during the relevant time
period meets the definition; the person’s status as an alcoholic, or not, is
irrelevant to the inquiry.”63 The court concluded Ledezma-Cosino was a
habitual drunkard based on the amount of alcohol he consumed and his
daughter’s testimony that he had a drinking problem.64
2. The Ninth Circuit Found That the Habitual Drunkard Provision is
Not Unconstitutionally Vague
The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the original three-judge panel and
concluded that the habitual drunkard provision is constitutional.65 The
court found that a person’s status as a habitual drunkard could easily be
determined by an objective factual inquiry.66 A statute will only be con-
sidered “unconstitutionally vague if it ‘is so standardless that it autho-
56 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) (2014); Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1046.
57 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1046.
58 Id. at 1045-49.
59 Id. at 1047.
60 Id. at 1046.
61 Id. at 1046-47.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 1046.
64 Id. at 1047.
65 Id.
66 Id.
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rizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement’ or if it ‘fails to
provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohib-
ited.’”67 The court concluded that the statute is not unconstitutionally
vague pursuant to the criminal law standard and therefore, must satisfy
the less-stringent standards for vagueness in non-criminal contexts.68 Fi-
nally, the court said Ledezma-Cosino could not argue that the statute is
vague as applied to other people when his conduct is clearly included.69
3. The Ninth Circuit Found That the Habitual Drunkard Provision
Does Not Violate Equal Protection Principles
The Ninth Circuit found the habitual drunkard provision to be con-
sistent with Equal Protection principles because the provision is ration-
ally related to legitimate government interests.70 The provision must pass
rational basis scrutiny, meaning it must be “rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental interest.”71 Under this standard, the burden is on
Ledezma-Cosino to show that the government has no conceivable basis
to support the government’s classification of habitual drunkards.72 The
court noted that it is rational for Congress to believe, for the legitimate
governmental interest of public safety, that habitual drunkards could pose
an excess risk “to themselves and to others, [so] cancellation of removal
was unwarranted” to that class of persons.73 The court also noted that
although this classification may be under-inclusive and other classes may
pose the same risks to public safety, “[a] legislature may address a prob-
lem ‘one step at a time.’”74 Ledezma-Cosino argued that classifying ha-
bitual drunkards as lacking good moral character was irrational, but the
court found this argument was inappropriate for purposes of the Equal
Protection Clause.75 Instead, the argument must focus on whether Con-
gress’s actions violate Equal Protection.76 Therefore, Congress’s choice
to deny “cancellation of removal to habitual drunkards” is not in viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.77 Further, whether habitual drunk-
ards lack good moral character is irrelevant to Equal Protection claims.78
67 Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)).
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 1048.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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II. TITLE VIII OF THE UNITED STATES CODE: LAWS GOVERNING
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY
Title VIII of the United States Code governs immigration and na-
tionality, which includes deportation of undocumented immigrants.79
Undocumented individuals that come to the United States may be de-
ported for various reasons,80 such as committing aggravated felonies or
partaking in illegal gambling.81 After a finding for deportation has been
made for any reason, undocumented immigrants may petition for cancel-
lation of removal to remain in the United States despite their eligibility
for removal.82
A. CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL STANDARD
Cancellation of removal, a form of declaratory relief, allows undocu-
mented immigrants that are subject to deportation to remain in the United
States if they meet four criteria.83 An undocumented immigrant may be
eligible for cancellation of removal if he or she: (a) has been physically,
continuously present in the United States for ten years; (b) has good
moral character during those ten years; (c) has not been convicted of
certain enumerated offenses; and (d) can prove that removal would cause
extreme hardship to a spouse, parent, or child who is a lawful resident or
United States citizen.84 This section and its elements were introduced in
1996 to create a stricter standard for “suspension of deportation.”85 For-
merly, the process of cancellation of removal was referred to as suspen-
sion of deportation and was held to a different, lower standard.86 Under
suspension of deportation, an applicant only needed to reside in the
United States, to maintain good moral character for seven years, and to
not be convicted of certain crimes.87 The Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”) created the original basis for suspension of deportation.88 In
1996, portions of the INA were annulled and superseded by the Illegal
79 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (2012).
80 Id.
81 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2014).
82 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012).
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Beth Holliday, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Good Moral Character” Re-
quirement for Cancellation of Removal of Alien Under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229b(b)(1)(B), 87 A.L.R. FED.
2D 231 (2014).
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., https://www.uscis
.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/act.html (last viewed Aug. 28, 2018).
9
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Immigration Reformation and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,89
which introduced the new procedure: cancellation of removal.90 When
determining whether an applicant is eligible for cancellation of removal,
the main element at issue is usually whether the person meets the good
moral character element.91
B. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
The only guidance courts have for determining good moral character
is a list of “unlawful or unethical behaviors”92 that preclude the finding
of good moral character as it applies to those seeking cancellation of
removal.93 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has clearly defined
what constitutes good moral character. When an applicant does not fall
within this codified list of precluded behaviors, the Immigration Judge
presiding over the case makes a discretionary determination of whether
an applicant has the necessary moral character to be eligible for cancella-
tion of removal.94 The requisite good moral character must be met and
maintained through the entirety of the ten-year period until the Immigra-
tion Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals makes a final decision.95
When making the good moral character determination, the Immigration
Judge balances favorable and unfavorable factors related to a person’s
character, and makes a decision based on the balancing test.96 Even when
a person’s character is similar to one of the prohibited behaviors, the
Immigration Judge must “consider [and balance] all of [the] evidence on
factors relevant to the determination of good moral character.”97
Under the good moral character statute,98 undocumented immigrants
conclusively lack good moral character if they: (1) are a habitual drunk-
ard; (2) have been convicted of certain crimes; (3) get their income prin-
cipally from illegal gambling; (4) have been convicted of at least two
gambling offenses; (5) have given false testimony; (6) have been con-
fined due to convictions for a combined total of at least 180 days; (7)
have been convicted of an aggravated felony; or (8) have engaged in
89 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, H.R. REP. NO. 104-
828, (1996), available at https://www.congress.gov/104/crpt/hrpt828/CRPT-104hrpt828.pdf.
90 Holliday, supra note 85, § 2.
91 Id.
92 Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1926 (2017).
93 Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d 531, 533 (9th Cir. 1986).
94 Holliday, supra note 85, § 3.
95 Id. § 5.
96 Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d at 534.
97 Id.
98 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2014).
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conduct relating to violations of religious freedom.99 This section is non-
exhaustive100 and includes a catch-all provision stating that “the fact that
any person is not within any of the specified classes of persons will not
preclude a finding that for other reasons such person is or was not of
good moral character” during the ten-year period before submitting an
application.101 Similar to good moral character, Congress and the Su-
preme Court have failed to define habitual drunkard.102
III. DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT AN APPLICANT IS CONSIDERED A
HABITUAL DRUNKARD
A. DEFINITION OF HABITUAL DRUNKARD
The term “habitual drunkard” is undefined in the immigration con-
text.103 To explain an undefined term, “[the court] generally interpret[s]
that term by employing the ordinary, contemporary, and common mean-
ing of the words that Congress used.”104 Here, Congress used the term
habitual drunkard which Black’s Law Dictionary previously defined as
“a person given to ebriety or the excessive use of intoxicating drink, who
has lost the power or the will by frequent indulgence, to control his appe-
tite for it.”105 Modernly, in Black’s Law Dictionary, the definition for
habitual drunkard is referred to as the definition of “drunkard.”106 A
drunkard is defined as “[s]omeone who habitually consumes intoxicating
substances excessively; [especially], one who is often intoxicated” and
may be used to refer to an alcoholic as well as a drug addict.107 Simi-
larly, an alcoholic is defined as “someone who habitually abuses alcohol
and loses self-control, often to the extent of endangering the health,
safety, or welfare of self or others.”108
The Ninth Circuit does not see the terms “habitual drunkard” and
“alcoholic” as synonymous.109 It bases its interpretation on Congress’s
tendency to use “habitual drunkard” in some contexts and “alcoholic” or
99 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2014).
100 Holliday, supra note 85, § 2.
101 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2014).
102 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2017).
103 Id.
104 Id. (quoting Arizona v. Tohono O’odham Nation, 818 F.3d 549, 556 (9th Cir. 2016)).
105 What is Habitual Drunkard?, LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1910), https://thelawdictionary
.org/habitual-drunkard/.
106 See Habitual Drunkard, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
107 Drunkard, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
108 Alcoholic, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
109 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1046-47.
11
Timpson: Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2019
38 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
“alcoholism” in other places of the immigration statutes.110 This indi-
cates that Congress intended for there to be two different meanings asso-
ciated with the words because they used the terms in different
contexts.111 Congress, however, does not explain how the terms are
meant to diverge from each other, except for using the different terms in
distinctive portions of the statutes.112 Using the dictionary definitions of
these terms, the phrases appear synonymous, but using an interpretation
of congressional intent, the words appear to have different meanings to
Congress.113 However, Congress does not provide any reasoning as to
why it used two different terms or how these terms are meant to be dif-
ferentiated. Regardless of the definitions of the terms, the presiding court
must make a factual inquiry into the person’s history to determine his or
her status as a habitual drunkard.114
B. FACTUAL INQUIRY TO DETERMINE WHETHER AN APPLICANT IS A
HABITUAL DRUNKARD
The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Policy
Manual instructs agents performing an inquiry into an applicant’s drink-
ing habits to look towards several factors to determine if a person quali-
fies as a habitual drunkard.115 This inquiry looks primarily at certain
documents to make the determination, which include, but are not limited
to: “divorce decrees, employment records, and arrest records. In addition,
termination of employment, unexplained periods of unemployment, and
arrests or multiple convictions for public intoxication or driving under
the influence.”116 One of the factors includes “multiple convictions for
. . . driving under the influence.”117 Thus, courts are reluctant to find one
or two DUIs without other aggravating circumstances as grounds to label
a person a habitual drunkard.118 This has also been insufficient to pre-
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 See Drunkard, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Ledezma-Cosino v.
Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1046-47.
114 Myriam Jaidi, Highlights of Good Moral Character in Naturalization, INSIGHTFUL IM-
MIGR. BLOG (Jan. 7, 2014), http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2014/01/highlights-of-good-moral-character-
in_7523.html.
115 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., Conditional Bars for Acts in Statutory Period, in
POLICY MANUAL, https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/HTML/PolicyManual-Volume12-PartF-Chap
ter5.html#S-J (last updated Aug. 15, 2017).
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 Jaidi, supra note 114.
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clude a finding of good moral character based on a person’s habitual
drunkenness.119
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FAILED TO CONSIDER MODERN TRENDS
CONCERNING ALCOHOLISM, THE INVOLUNTARY NATURE OF
ALCOHOLISM, AND THE LEGALITY OF DRINKING
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis focused primarily on the constitutional-
ity of the habitual drunkard provision, seemingly when it was enacted,
but failed to take into account how the public’s view regarding alcohol
consumption has changed drastically since the habitual drunkard provi-
sion’s inception.120 Specifically, the court failed to consider modern
trends showing that alcoholism is an involuntary disease and that alcohol
consumption is legal. This is contrary to the other seven precluded cate-
gories of persons in making a good moral character determination, which
all involve both voluntary intent and illegality.121
A. THE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER RECENT STUDIES SHOWING
ALCOHOLISM IS A DISEASE AND IS DIFFERENT FROM
CLASSIFICATION AS A “HABITUAL DRUNKARD”
The court erred in finding that the habitual drunkard provision is a
legitimate bar to proving good moral character. Today, alcoholism is less
often considered a moral shortcoming and more often seen as a medical
disease.122 The habitual drunkard provision went into effect in 1952
through the Immigration and Nationality Act.123 In 1956, the American
Medical Association classified alcoholism as a disease.124 Afterwards, it
took many years for the public to accept alcoholism as a disease.125 In
2016, the United States Surgeon General released a report highlighting
119 Id.; see also Rangel v. Barrows, No. 4:07-cv-279, 2008 WL 4441974, at *4 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 25, 2008); Ragoonanan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., No. 07-3461 PAM/JSM,
2007 WL 4465208, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2007); Yaqub v. Gonzalez, No. 1:05-cv-170, 2006 WL
1582440, at *4-5 (S.D. Ohio June 6, 2006); and Le v. Elwood, No. Civ. A. 02-CV-3368, 2003 WL
21250632, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
120 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2017).
121 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).
122 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 25, at
2-1.
123 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163, 167 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1)), available at https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/
SLB/HTML/SLB/act.html.
124 Why is Alcoholism a Disease?, FOUND. FOR ALCOHOLISM RES. (Dec. 27, 2013), http://
alcoholismresearch.org/why-is-alcoholism-a-disease/ (the American Medical Association is the larg-
est network of physicians and medical students in the United States).
125 Karl Mann et al., One Hundred Years of Alcoholism: The Twentieth Century, 35 ALCOHOL
& ALCOHOLISM 10 (Jan. 1, 2000), https://academic.oup.com/alcalc/article/35/1/10/142396.
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the prevalence of America’s alcohol and drug-related issues.126 The re-
port also discussed how views of alcohol and addiction have evolved
from “moral failing[s] or character flaw[s], [to] now [being] understood
to be chronic illnesses characterized by clinically significant impairments
in health, social function, and voluntary control.”127 In Chief Judge Sid-
ney R. Thomas’s dissent, he faulted the majority for allowing a person’s
status as a recovering alcoholic to bar an applicant from establishing
good moral character.128 The court has not accepted this classification. It
should have considered the modern views of alcoholism in making its
determination. Instead, it used an outdated view of “drunks” as immoral
to bar an undocumented immigrant from getting relief.129
Although the majority opinion reasoned that there is a difference
between habitual drunkards and persons suffering from alcoholism,130
the dictionary definitions do not compel as grand a distinction as the
majority portrays.131 Thus, by failing to consider the nearly identical def-
initions, differing only in that drunkard also encompasses persons ad-
dicted to other intoxicants, the court erred in finding the habitual
drunkard provision a legitimate bar to finding good moral character. As
the Surgeon General’s report indicated, substance use, including alcohol-
ism, was considered immoral but is modernly accepted as an involuntary
genetic disorder.132 Likewise, the habitual drunkard provision should be
analyzed as a disease and not as a moral shortcoming.
B. THE HABITUAL DRUNKARD PROVISION SHOULD BE DISTINGUISHED
BECAUSE THE REMAINING PRECLUDED CATEGORIES INDICATE
VOLUNTARY BEHAVIORS
All of the precluded behaviors in the good moral character statute
involved more voluntary decisions, with the exception of the habitual
drunkard provision, which can be distinguished by its more involuntary
nature. The statute lists eight behaviors that preclude a person from
showing good moral character.133 A person falling within one or more of
126 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 25, at 1-
1 to -12.
127 Id. at 2-1.
128 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1053-54 (9th Cir. 2017) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
129 Id. at 1057.
130 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1046-47.
131 See Drunkard, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Alcoholic, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
132 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 25, at
2-1.
133 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2014).
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these enumerated categories is barred from proving that he or she is of
good moral character.134 Each of these prohibited behaviors includes a
voluntary component with the exception of the habitual drunkard provi-
sion.135 First, undocumented individuals entering the United States to
promote prostitution, smuggling, polygamy, and other criminal acts are
barred from showing they have good moral character.136 The second and
third categories involve gambling and provide that a person will inher-
ently lack good moral character if their primary “income is derived prin-
cipally from illegal gambling activities” or if they have convictions for at
least two gambling offenses.137 Certain gambling activities are consid-
ered illegal.138 Although what constitutes “illegal gambling” varies by
state, running an illegal gambling business will typically qualify as an
“illegal gambling activity.”139 Fourth, a person that chooses to give false
testimony to benefit from the protections of the United States laws gov-
erning immigration and nationality will also be barred from showing
good moral character.140 Fifth, a person convicted of crimes and con-
fined for an aggregate 180 days will be precluded.141 Sixth, an applicant
convicted of an aggravated felony will lack good moral character.142 Fi-
nally, individuals engaging in conduct violating religious freedom or re-
lating to participation in Nazi persecution automatically lack good moral
character.143
In contrast to the categories above, suffering from habitual drunken-
ness is more often than not accompanied by involuntary and genetic pre-
dispositions to alcohol abuse.144 Alcoholism has been scientifically
proven to be an uncontrollable behavior in many people.145 As of 2015,
15.1 million adults suffer from Alcohol Use Disorder,146 which is a
“chronic relapsing brain disease characterized by an impaired ability to
stop or control alcohol use despite adverse social, occupational, or health
134 See Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1052.
135 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2014).
136 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (2014).
137 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(4)-(5) (2014) (emphasis added).
138 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2014).
139 Id.
140 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6) (2014).
141 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7) (2014).
142 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) (2014).
143 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(9) (2014).
144 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 25, at
2-1.
145 Id.
146 Alcohol Facts and Statistics, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, https://
www.niaaa.nih.gov/alcohol-health/overview-alcohol-consumption/alcohol-facts-and-statistics (last
updated Aug. 2018).
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consequences.”147 Thus, labeling a person as a “habitual drunkard” for
something they cannot control is an inappropriate way to approach this
inquiry. By associating people classified as habitual drunkards with the
other precluded categories, and allowing this classification to stand, the
court ignored the fact that alcoholism is a disease that is comprised of an
involuntary urge to consume alcohol. Therefore, being a habitual drunk-
ard is not a voluntary behavior that should preclude a person from show-
ing that he or she has good moral character despite a dependence on
alcohol.
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT EFFECTIVELY TREATED ALCOHOL
CONSUMPTION AS A FELONY BECAUSE IT FAILED TO
CONSIDER THE LEGALITY OF ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION
Each of the eight provisions in the good moral character statute, with
the exception of being a habitual drunkard, encompass behavior that is
illegal in some way.148 Illegal gambling,149 polygamy,150 and aggravated
felonies151 to name a few of the precluded categories, are all behaviors or
actions that have an illegal component; whereas drinking alcohol is legal,
except when drinking under the legal drinking age limit.152 The habitual
drunkard provision was passed in 1952,153 19 years after the Twenty-
First Amendment repealed prohibition.154 Since the habitual drunkard
provision was enacted when the Constitution no longer prohibited alco-
hol, the act of merely drinking has been legal continuously from the time
Congress enacted this provision.155 Thus, the Ninth Circuit erred by al-
lowing the habitual drunkard provision to stand amidst other illegal ac-
tivities that actually indicate a lack of good moral character.
Further, comparing habitual drunkards to most of the other catego-
ries within the good moral character statute makes the act of drinking
147 Id.
148 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2014).
149 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(4) (2014).
150 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3) (2014).
151 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) (2014).
152
 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C.
§ 158 (2012), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title23/pdf/USCODE-
2011-title23-chap1-sec158.pdf (Although there was a time between the ratification of the Eighteenth
Amendment in 1919 and the ratification of the Twenty-First Amendment in 1933 when drinking
alcohol was illegal, that period of time is irrelevant to the present inquiry because the habitual
drunkard provision was passed in 1952 after drinking became legal again in 1933.).
153 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 101, 66 Stat. 163, 167 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1)), https://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/
SLB/act.html.
154 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
155 See id.
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synonymous to felonies.156 Felonies are “serious crime[s], characterized
under federal law and many state statutes as any offense punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year.”157 Drinking alcohol habit-
ually is neither a crime nor an offense that is “punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year.”158 Although there are restrictions
related to the consumption of alcohol, such as driving under the influ-
ence,159 the mere consumption of alcohol is not.160 Under the penalty
statute for driving under the influence, regardless of repeated offenses,
DUIs will always result in less than a year of imprisonment and are
therefore not a felony by definition.161
Moreover, many lower courts agree that one or two alcohol-related
convictions does not preclude an applicant from establishing good moral
character.162 Although most of these cases are unreported, courts have
found that a person does not lack good moral character merely because
he has one or two DUIs or other alcohol-related offenses.163 Therefore,
even if there are some alcohol-related offenses, neither the act of drink-
ing nor a single DUI should preclude the finding of good moral
character.
V. SOLUTIONS
A. THE COURT SHOULD CLEARLY DEFINE THE TERM HABITUAL
DRUNKARD AND DISTINGUISH IT FROM THE TERM
“ALCOHOLIC”
The court should use its power of statutory interpretation to clearly
define and distinguish habitual drunkards from alcoholics. Although the
prevailing view decades ago was that people who consumed alcohol
were inherently immoral,164 modern trends now accept people suffering
156 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2014).
157 Felony, FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/felony (last vis-
ited Sept. 11, 2018).
158 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also Felony, FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-dictionary
.thefreedictionary.com/felony (last visited Sept. 11, 2018).
159 See 23 U.S.C. § 164 (2016).
160 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
161 See 23 U.S.C. § 164(a)(5) (2016).
162 Rangel v. Barrows, No. 4:07-cv-279, 2008 WL 4441974, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2008).
163 See Rangel v. Barrows, No. 4:07-cv-279, 2008 WL 4441974, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 25,
2008); Ragoonanan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv. No. 07-3461 PAMJSM, 2007 WL
4465208, at *5 (D. Minn. Dec. 18, 2007); Yaqub v. Gonzales, No. 1:05-cv-170, 2006 WL 1582440,
at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 6, 2006); and Le v. Elwood, No. Civ. A. 02-CV-3368, 2003 WL 21250632, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2003).
164 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 25, at
2-1.
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from alcoholism as people suffering from a disease and not persons hav-
ing a character flaw.165 If the court wishes to uphold the habitual drunk-
ard provision as it is, then the court should “determine the meaning of the
phrase habitual drunkard in a way that does not make the phrase synony-
mous with ‘alcoholic.’”166 By failing to create a distinction between the
two terms, the court interprets that those suffering from and diagnosed
with the disease of alcoholism are immoral, rather than sick.167 As dis-
cussed above, alcoholism is modernly accepted as a disease or disor-
der.168 Thus, the court maintained the archaic view that excessive alcohol
consumption means a person cannot have good moral character despite a
person’s medical diagnosis as an alcoholic. Although actually changing
the good moral character statute is up to Congress, by not clearly defin-
ing or distinguishing the terms habitual drunkard and alcoholic, the court
failed to alert Congress to the potential problems with applying the stat-
ute fairly.
B. THE COURT SHOULD ALSO PROPOSE THAT CONGRESS AMEND THE
GOOD MORAL CHARACTER STATUTE TO BETTER DEFINE
HABITUAL DRUNKARD
Further, the court should recommend that Congress reconsider the
effects of the habitual drunkard provision and revise this statute in one of
two proposed amendments. First, the statute would still have its desired
effect by removing the habitual drunkard provision from outright pre-
cluding a finding of good moral character. The only other reported Board
of Immigration Appeals decision to use the habitual drunkard provision
was decided nearly 60 years ago.169 In In re H, the Board of Immigration
Appeals held that the applicant was not eligible for cancellation of re-
moval and was barred from relief because he fell within the habitual
drunkard provision “and is thereby unable to prove good moral charac-
ter.”170 There are no other reported cases discussing the habitual drunk-
ard provision in the removability or cancellation of removal realms.
Second, if removal of this provision is considered unwarranted, the
statute should adequately and precisely define the term habitual drunkard
in order for courts to better apply it since it is unclear how a habitual
165 Id.
166 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d 1042, 1060 (9th Cir. 2017) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
167 Id. at 1058-59.
168 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 25, at
2-1.
169 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1054.
170 In re H., 6 I. & N. Dec. 614 (B.I.A. 1955).
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drunkard differs from being medically diagnosed as an alcoholic. As this
case indicates, the lack of a clear definition detailing who qualifies as a
habitual drunkard makes it difficult to properly adjudicate petitions for
cancellation of removal.171 Originally, a three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit found the habitual drunkard provision to be unconstitutional.172
The three-judge panel defined habitual drunkards as “persons with
chronic alcoholism” which would be more consistent with the modern
views of alcoholism as a disease and not a moral character flaw.173 The
en banc panel similarly varied in its interpretations of the provision’s
meaning by defining habitual drunkard as “a person who regularly drinks
alcoholic beverages to excess.”174 Chief Judge Thomas’s dissent does
not directly define habitual drunkard, but urges the court or Congress to
determine the correct legal definitions of “habitual drunkards” and
“chronic alcoholics” since they are not synonymous.175 In the Ninth Cir-
cuit alone, three different groups of judges have defined habitual drunk-
ard differently and thus, at the very least, a clear definition of habitual
drunkard needs to be provided if this provision is to be used more fre-
quently in the future. A clarifying definition is needed to ensure that
applicants seeking cancellation are actually morally compromised rather
than suffering from a medical disease.
C. THE COURT SHOULD ESTABLISH A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION
REGARDING A PERSON’S GOOD MORAL CHARACTER WITHIN
THE CONTEXT OF HABITUAL DRUNKARDS IF STATUTORY
AMENDMENTS ARE DISFAVORED
In the context of habitual drunkards, courts should implement a re-
buttable presumption that allows people who fall into the habitual drunk-
ard category to provide evidence that he or she maintains good moral
character. As it stands now under the good moral character statute, un-
documented applicants falling within the habitual drunkard provision are
automatically barred from showing they have good moral character.176
When a person does not fall within one of the categories that automati-
cally preclude a finding of good moral character, courts balance
favorable and unfavorable facts that provide insight into a person’s char-
171 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1058.
172 Ledezma-Cosino v. Lynch, 819 F.3d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016), vacated, 857 F.3d 1042
(9th Cir. 2017).
173 Id. at 1075.
174 Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, 857 F.3d at 1046.
175 Id. at 1053-54.
176 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) (2014).
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acter to determine whether an applicant has good moral character.177 Due
to the historically negative view of alcohol,178 this balancing test is not
currently applied to people deemed habitual drunkards.179 However, this
Note urges the court to reconsider the current approach to allow appli-
cants that inevitably fall within this category to systematically show their
good moral character, despite the possibility of alcohol dependence. The
proposed alternative balancing test would weigh favorable and unfavora-
ble factors of a person’s character. It is the fact finder’s function to
gather all the evidence and adjudicate the issues based on all of the facts
presented.180 Thus, implementing a balancing test that allows for a show-
ing that a person is capable of maintaining good moral character despite
alcohol dependency may inject more fairness into the process. This
would hold persons falling into this category to a higher standard be-
cause instead of merely providing evidence for the court to balance, as
the court does in other situations, the applicant would need to provide
more evidence to overcome the presumption. Despite being a higher
standard, it would at least allow the applicant a chance to overcome this
presumption if his or her only flaw is an involuntary urge to consume
alcohol.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions, the Ninth Circuit missed an opportu-
nity to declare the good moral character statute, and specifically the ha-
bitual drunkard provision of that statute, as vague and unconstitutional.
The court could have proposed a better way to handle the inquiry into
someone’s good moral character rather than outright preclude him or her
due to behavior not fully within his or her control. Going forward, Con-
gress should amend the statutes accordingly or the courts should follow a
balancing test to determine whether each person found to be a habitual
drunkard is of good moral character despite being diagnosed with alco-
holism. This balancing test will ensure a higher degree of fairness to all
affected by the preclusion of showing good moral character.
Ledezma-Cosino v. Sessions may pave the way to broadening the
methods the court uses to find a person ineligible for cancellation of re-
moval since the habitual drunkard provision has not been discussed or
177 Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1986).
178 U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 25, at
2-1.
179 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f); see also Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d at 534 (rejecting the
notion that conduct not within the enumerated categories of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f) can be a bar to good
moral character without considering other relevant factors) (emphasis added).
180 Torres-Guzman v. INS, 804 F.2d at 534.
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used in any reported cases as a basis for finding a lack of good moral
character in over 50 years.181 Despite significant evidence that people
who drink in excess often do so out of their control,182 Congress has
implemented a federal law183 that will exclude undocumented immi-
grants based on a diagnosis of alcoholism, which is something that is less
voluntary than what was previously known to society.184 At the very
least, because this provision has not been used excessively in the past,
the Ninth Circuit’s decision will likely bring the provision back into the
attention of the agencies that adjudicate claims relating to immigration as
a means to exclude undocumented immigrants for lacking good moral
character.
With the current presidential administration focusing its efforts on
reducing illegal immigration,185 it is likely that the habitual drunkard
provision will become more relevant going forward. The United States
was once considered a “nation of immigrants,”186 yet the current admin-
istration seeks to take that thought out of the minds of Americans by
increasing its efforts to control, minimize, and criminalize immigra-
tion.187 The United States would not be where it is today if it were not
for immigrants. Thus, rather than ignoring the plight of immigrants that
need help, the government should focus its efforts on helping them and
once again pride itself as a “nation of immigrants.”188 Alcoholism is a
continuing problem throughout society, even among immigrants.189
Thus, instead of criminalizing the consumption of alcohol, as the good
moral character statute does, Congress and the courts should create legis-
lation that promotes recovery, rather than deportation. Although it is too
late for Salomon Ledezma-Cosino since the Supreme Court denied certi-
orari,190 it is not too late for the courts and Congress to change the course
of future jurisprudence surrounding this vague statute.
181 Holliday, supra note 85, § 3.
182 See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 25,
at 2-1.
183 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1) (2014).
184 See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., supra note 25,
at 2-1.
185 President Donald Trump, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2017) (transcript available at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address/) (the administration of President
Trump declaring immigration one of its top priorities).
186 KENNEDY, supra note 1.
187 See Sephora Smith, Trump Again Threatens Government Shutdown Over Immigration,
NBC NEWS (July 29, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-again-threat
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